Study objective: In 2008, a pay-for-performance program was implemented in sequential waves in Ontario emergency departments (EDs), with the aim of reducing length of stay. We seek to evaluate its effects on ED length of stay and quality of care.
INTRODUCTION
Pay-for-performance incentives to drive improvements in quality and efficiency have been increasingly used in health care environments during the past decade. 1, 2 Initially, the majority of pay-for-performance initiatives were targeted at primary care. 2 More recently, incentive programs have been directed toward hospitals and specialist services. 3 However, the evidence for pay-for-performance programs to improve quality of care and patient outcomes is mixed. 4, 5 The emergency department (ED) is one important area in which pay for performance has not yet been widely implemented or rigorously evaluated. Prolonged ED waiting times and crowding are a concern in many jurisdictions [6] [7] [8] and are associated with important adverse consequences for patients. 7, [9] [10] [11] However, concerns have been raised about the potential risks to quality of care when the focus is on meeting time-based performance targets. 12, 13 In 2008, the Ontario Ministry of Health and LongTerm Care launched the Emergency Department Wait Times strategy to address ED crowding and reduce length of stay ( Figure 1 ).
14 Several initiatives were implemented as part of this strategy, including public reporting of ED performance in 2008, 15 setting province-wide benchmarks and targets for ED length of stay in early 2009, 15 a targeted ED process improvement (lean) program to improve patient flow within hospitals in 2009, 14 and the Pay for Results Program, a pay-for-performance program that provided annual financial incentives to hospitals for improved performance on ED length-of-stay targets, in April 2008.
Editor's Capsule Summary
What is already known on this topic The effects of pay-for-performance initiatives on quality improvement and patient outcomes are mixed.
What question this study addressed
The authors evaluated the effect of a pay-forperformance program implemented in Ontario, Canada, on emergency department (ED) length of stay and quality of care by comparing the change in these outcomes 1 year after implementation between program and control hospitals.
What this study adds to our knowledge Short-term, modest improvements were observed as a result of greater reductions or smaller increases in ED length of stay in program versus control hospitals.
How this is relevant to clinical practice
The effects of pay-for-performance programs on ED processes and outcomes deserve further study, particularly the effect of design features and contextual factors. respect to quality of care. We hypothesized that the program would be associated with an improvement in ED length of stay but not associated with unintended consequences.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The pay-for-performance program was the first performance-based funding strategy directed at EDs in Ontario. Hospitals were rewarded for improvements in achieving specific benchmarks for ED length of stay, as specified by the Ministry: a maximum of 8 hours for patients admitted to the hospital or triaged as high acuity (defined as Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale 16 15 The Ministry set targets for compliance with benchmarks of 90% or greater. To be eligible for funding, designated hospitals had to meet certain conditions, including being an acute care facility with 20,000 or more annual ED visits that accepts urgent or emergency ambulance patients 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Sites were required to submit data on ambulance offloads, ED length of stay, and other measures of ED quality of care for regular review by the Ministry.
The Ministry determined eligibility for the pay-forperformance program and selected sites for participation annually. In wave 1 of the program (fiscal year 2008/2009), Ontario hospitals with the largest number of patients exceeding ED length-of-stay benchmarks were targeted, 14 with subsequent expansion to additional eligible hospitals annually. All participating hospitals were notified which wave they were allocated to before the introduction of the program; thus, lead time varied from a few months for wave 1 sites to at least 1 year for wave 2 sites and more than 2 years for wave 3 sites. Notice of annual performance targets for the program was typically given between January and March for the upcoming fiscal year. There were 23 hospitals enrolled in wave 1 (fiscal year 2008/2009), with paid incentives totaling $30 million spread across all hospitals.
14 An additional 23 and 25 hospitals joined in wave 2 (2009/2010) and wave 3 (2010/2011), with incentives of $55 million and $100 million, respectively. 17, 18 Hospitals in waves 1 and 2 remained in the pay-for-performance program through fiscal year 2010 to 2011. The first wave targeted extreme ED lengths of stay (>24 hours) and set a performance goal of a 5% improvement in provincial ED length-of-stay targets (Table 1 ). In the second wave, the performance goal was 10%. The third wave set a performance goal of 15% and also mandated a decrease in time to initial physician assessment. Incentives were allocated internally within each hospital, but there were stipulations not to use payments to supplement physician income. Funds were not restricted to the ED and could be used to improve flow in inpatient areas as well. Failure to attain specified targets could render payments subject to recovery. There was no "tournament" or competitive component to the payment scheme, which allowed certain high-performing hospitals to lead shared-learning events and activities facilitating the dissemination of best practices. Table 1 describes the framework and variation in performance expectations associated with the pay-for-performance program in each of the 3 waves.
Setting and Selection of Participants
We conducted a retrospective observational study of ED visits among hospitals that were eligible for the pay-forperformance program in Ontario from April 1, 2007 , to March 31, 2011. Frequency-matched control hospitals were selected separately for each wave. A hospital could be a control for multiple waves of the program; hospitals were excluded as controls if they had participated in the pay-forperformance program in a previous wave. Controls were matched if the median ED length of stay in the year before a given program wave was within 0.5 hours of the range of median ED length of stay at program sites.
We excluded low-volume (<25,000 annual ED visits) hospitals (because ED length of stay tends not to be prolonged at these sites), pediatric hospitals (because of the difficulty of finding suitable controls for a small number of hospitals), and hospitals that had participated in pilot programs to reduce ED length of stay before the introduction of the pay-for-performance program (because we did not have data on the duration of their participation in these and other programs to reduce ED waiting times).
ED visits were identified through the National Ambulatory Care Reporting System [19] [20] [21] and hospital admissions through the Discharge Abstract Database, 22 both of which are collected through the Canadian Institute for Health Information. The Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care requires all hospitals to submit all ED visit and hospital separation data to the Canadian Institute for Health Information. Deaths were identified from the Registered Persons Database, a population-based registry of all legal residents in Ontario. 23 Neighborhood income quintile and community type were derived from Statistics Canada 2006 census estimates. These data sets were linked with unique encoded identifiers and analyzed at the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences.
Outcome Measures
The primary outcome was 90th percentile ED length of stay, consistent with the targets set by the Ministry. This was defined as the time from triage or registration (whichever was earlier) to the time the patient left the ED. Other outcomes included median ED length of stay, as well as 90th percentile and median time to initial physician assessment (defined as the time from triage or registration to the time the patient was first assessed by a physician). We examined ED length of stay according to whether the patient was admitted because performance targets differed according to admission and others have found that benchmarks were associated with an increase in ED length of stay among admitted patients. 12 We also examined a number of ED quality-of-care measures identified in the literature and through a Delphi panel process. 24 These included rates of patients who left without being seen by a physician, 24 overall and short-term (<48-hour) hospital admission, 7-and 30-day mortality, 30-day readmission among admitted patients, and 72-hour unscheduled ED revisits among discharged patients. 24 We examined hospital admission rates because the introduction of ED length-of-stay benchmarks might lead to a change in admission practices, and short-term admissions may be a proxy for avoidable hospitalizations.
Study Design
Because selection criteria for pay-for-performance hospitals changed from wave to wave, we conducted separate analyses for each wave according to the fiscal year they were introduced to the program. We compared baseline characteristics of pay-for-performance hospitals and controls in the fiscal year before each wave with respect to age, sex, ED length of stay, physician initial assessment, ED volume, teaching hospital status, 25 admission rates, percentage of resuscitation and emergency patients (Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale level I or II), participation in an Alternative Funding Arrangement plan (a model of physician payment typically based on an hourly rate instead of fee for service), and participation in a Ministry lean program to improve patient flow or other lean-type interventions during each month.
We conducted difference-in-differences analyses to compare the change in each outcome in the first fiscal year after the introduction of pay for performance between program and control hospitals. [26] [27] [28] [29] Regression model details are shown in Appendix E1 (available online at http://www. annemergmed.com).
This study received approval from the research ethics board of Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre. Descriptive analyses were generated with SAS (version 9.3; SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC). 30 Stata MP (version 12.1; StataCorp, College Station, TX) for Unix was used for all multivariable models. 31 
RESULTS
There were 87 eligible hospitals during the first 3 waves of the pay-for-performance program. Of these, 8 were Performance target: fixed funding 49 Extreme ED LOS* (>24 h) must be reduced to a maximum of 2% of total patients
The % of patients treated within the provincial ED LOS targets must increase by 10% above the 2008/09 baseline:
The Table 2 shows baseline characteristics of program and control sites in each respective wave before the start of the program. In some waves, program sites had higher volumes (waves 2 and 3), were more likely to have participated in other lean-type interventions (wave 3), were more (wave 3) or less (wave 2) likely to be Alternative Funding Arrangement hospitals, or were more likely to be teaching hospitals (waves 1 and 2) than control sites.
Figures 2 and 3 present the results of the difference-indifferences models comparing the change in outcomes at pay-for-performance hospitals with controls (full model details are available in Tables E1 through E3 , available online at http://www.annemergmed.com). Figure 2 shows the effects of the program on ED length of stay in each of the 3 program waves. In these models, pay-for-performance hospitals had small but significantly greater reductions in overall 90th percentile ED length of stay in wave 1 (-36 minutes) but not wave 2 or 3. Significant reductions were also observed in waves 1 and 3 sites for ED length of stay among nonadmitted patients, and waves 1 and 2 sites experienced reductions in ED length of stay among admitted patients. Wave 3 sites had lower overall median ED length of stay, 90th percentile and median time to physician assessment, and length of stay for nonadmitted patients, particularly those classified as low acuity. Figure 3 shows the effects of the pay-for-performance program on ED length-of-stay targets and quality-of-care measures in each of the 3 program waves. Improvements in targets were observed for both admitted and nonadmitted patients across all waves. The program was not associated with any unintended consequences, and the rate of patients who left without being seen decreased in waves 1 and 3. Table 2 . Baseline characteristics of ED visits at pay-for-performance and control hospitals in the year before the introduction of the program. 
LIMITATIONS
This study had several limitations. Administrative data are subject to inaccuracies, but we used some of the most reliable data elements. 19, 20 Some data elements such as time of initial physician assessment had more missing data. Program assignment was not random and program sites may have been different from control sites, limiting generalizability. The number of suitable controls diminished with each wave, and although we frequencymatched controls with program sites, there remained some differences in hospital characteristics (these factors were controlled for in multivariable models); thus, there may have been residual confounding. All EDs were required to publicly report ED length of stay; this overlapped with the pay-for-performance program, and hence we could not distinguish the independent effect of each initiative.
Although public reporting is associated with improvements in quality-of-care measures and patient outcomes in some settings, 32 including Ontario, 33 others have also observed additional positive effects of pay for performance in the context of public reporting. 34 We did not have detailed information about how financial incentives were used at individual hospitals; a better understanding of program features could identify factors associated with success. It is possible that some control hospitals became increasingly engaged in efforts to reduce ED length of stay, which may have diminished the effect among pay-for-performance sites. Because a number of controls joined the program, we did not have a sufficient number of them to extend the follow-up period beyond 1 year. Pay for performance in health care varies, limiting generalizability to programs with different designs. However, this evaluation did benefit Figure 2 . Change in ED length of stay before and after the Ontario Pay-for-Results program among program sites compared with control sites (difference-in-differences models). *Adjusted for age/sex group, Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group, participation in the government-funded Emergency Department Process Improvement Program (lean), participation in other lean-type interventions, participation in an Alternative Funding Arrangement plan, emergency department volume, teaching hospital, calendar month, individual emergency department.
from having no competing incentives in a single-payer system.
DISCUSSION
Among Ontario hospitals participating in a voluntary pay-for-performance program, there were moderate improvements in overall ED length of stay compared with that of control sites. In the first 2 waves, reductions in ED length of stay were most pronounced among admitted patients. Overall performance with respect to benchmarks also improved. In some instances, improvements in ED length of stay represented greater reductions among program sites; in others, program sites experienced increases that were less pronounced than those at control sites. These findings were consistent with the structure of the incentives, particularly in the first wave, in which the focus was on reductions in extreme baseline lengths of stay. In addition, program sites experienced greater reductions in time to see a physician in wave 3 of the program, in which this measure was explicitly targeted for the first time. We did not observe significant adverse consequences; rather, we observed a decline in the left-without-being-seen rate among program sites in the first and third waves. On balance, these findings suggest modest improvements associated with the use of financial incentives to target ED length of stay and provide evidence that there are not unintended effects with respect to quality of care.
Recent studies of pay-for-performance initiatives show few positive results, whether the incentives targeted hospitals 29, [35] [36] [37] [38] or primary care providers. 5,39-41 Studies of pay-for-performance initiatives in the ED are rarer, but one before-after study found that payments for meeting Figure 3 . Change in ED length-of-stay targets and quality-of-care outcomes before and after the Ontario Pay-for-Results program among program sites compared with control sites (difference-in-differences models). *Adjusted for age/sex group, Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group, participation in the government-funded Emergency Department Process Improvement Program (lean), participation in other lean-type interventions, participation in an Alternative Funding Arrangement plan, emergency department volume, teaching hospital, calendar month, individual emergency department.
ED length-of-stay targets were effective, 39 whereas another in British Columbia observed mixed results across different health regions. 42 In our study, the most sizeable gains were found among hospitals with the poorest baseline performance, ie, those in wave 1. These findings are consistent with other research identifying greater effects of pay-for-performance for the poorest performers. 34, 41, 43 The design of financial incentive programs in health care is important to success. 43 Programs targeting institutions with larger financial incentives and opportunities for shared learning may be more effective than those aimed at individual physicians or physician groups. 29, 37, 44, 45 Several features of Ontario's pay-for-performance program may have been beneficial, including paying the incentive to the hospital up front and subjecting it to recovery if performance did not meet targets, which would appeal to loss aversion 46 ; an absence of competition (ie, improvement was not based on ranking among EDs and all had an opportunity to achieve the gains required to earn incentives), 43, 47 and shared learning opportunities among participating sites. 29 On the other hand, some features may have limited success; for example, incentives were not necessarily aligned with the dominant funding structure (global budgets) for Ontario hospitals, which for the most part is not linked to performance. 48 In addition, the program's financial incentives alone may have been incapable of significantly addressing access to inpatient beds, a major contributor to ED crowding, especially in Ontario, 49 and could not address community resources such as beds in chronic care facilities needed for the postacute care of hospital patients because they are not funded by hospitals. 50 Finally, the annual incentive allocations may have led to uncertainty about their sustainability and reduced willingness to make longer-term investments.
This study examined financial incentives directed at ED length of stay in a large sample of EDs using contemporaneous controls for comparison. Our results suggest that in a context of a comprehensive strategy to address ED crowding, the pay-for-performance program provided modest additional benefits (ie, attenuated deterioration or improvement in waiting times) without adversely affecting quality of care, which may mitigate concerns about the effect of pay for performance on quality-of-care measures that are not subject to incentives. A remaining question concerns the sustainability of performance improvement through financial incentives. This study examined only the first year after implementation, and a longer period of follow-up may have revealed greater effect, although several studies have found that initial gains in quality-of-care measures and patient outcomes attenuate over time. 35, 44, 50 It is also unclear whether more specific hospital characteristics or program design features played a role in the variable effects across different waves of the program. In future research, attention needs to be paid to sustainability, incentive design, and contextual factors in determining the effectiveness of payfor-performance schemes.
The authors acknowledge Howard Ovens, MD, CCFP (EM), for his invaluable assistance in providing information on the pay-for-performance program characteristics. Author contributions: MJV, TAS, AG, and MJS were responsible for study conception and design. MJV and TAS were responsible for data analysis. MJV, TAS, ASB, and MJS were responsible for interpretation of the data. MJV, ASB, and MJS were responsible for drafting the article. All authors were responsible for revising the article, gave final approval of the version to be published, and agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and resolved. MJV takes responsibility for the paper as a whole. 
APPENDIX E1 Details of statistical models
To calculate 90th percentile and median ED length of stay and time to physician assessment, data were collapsed into ED, week, age/sex group (male and female patients aged 0 to 19, 20 to 44, 45 to 64, 65 to 74, and >74 years) and Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group (high [I to III] versus low acuity [IV to V]) strata, and dependent variables were calculated within each stratum; thus, patients with missing data on age, sex, or Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale level were excluded. Patients with missing data on ED length of stay or time to physician assessment were not included in the calculation of these outcomes but were included in the calculation of quality-of-care measures. The unit of analysis was the ED, week, age/sex group, and Canadian Triage and Acuity Scale group stratum, and there were 241,185 observations when data were collapsed for modeling purposes.
Separate regression models were used for each outcome. We modeled the change in ED length of stay and time to physician initial assessment after implementation of the pay-for-performance program, using generalized least squares for serially correlated continuous data, 1 applying an autoregressive AR1 correlation structure, weighting by stratum population. To model the change in the number of patients meeting ED length-of-stay targets and unintended consequences, we used generalized estimating equations 2 Poisson models for serially correlated count data, applying an AR1 correlation structure, with the logarithm of the stratum population as the offset parameter. Because patients visiting the same hospital have correlated outcomes, we clustered by hospital to adjust the standard errors.
The change in outcome was modeled with separate dummy variables for pay-for-performance and control sites to compare the single fiscal year after the program started to the previous fiscal year. For 
